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Summary: The typical firm produces for sale a plural number of distinct product lines.  This
paper characterizes the composition of a firm’s optimal production vector as a function of cost
and revenue function attributes.  The approach taken applies mathematical group theory and
revealed preference arguments to exploit controlled asymmetries in the production environment. 
Assuming some symmetry on the cost function, our central result shows that all optimal
production vectors must satisfy a dominance relation on permutations of the firm’s revenue
function.  When the revenue function is linear in outputs, then the set of admissible output
vectors has linear bounds up to transformations.  If these transformations are also linear, then
convex analysis can be applied to characterize the set of admissible solutions.  When the group of
symmetries decomposes into a direct product group with index  , then the characterization κ 0ù
problem separates into   problems of smaller dimension.  The central result may be strengthened κ
when the cost function is assumed to be quasiconvex.
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1 Coase (p. 402) writes "But it is clearly important to investigate how the number of products produced
by a firm is determined, while no theory which assumes that only one product is in fact produced can have
very great practical significance."
    
2 For concerns about bias in their methodology, see Graham et al. (2002).
1  Introduction
Arguably, the firm that produces multiple products for sale is more representative of observed
production activities than the firm that produces a single product for sale.  Transactions costs
analysis, in focusing attention on firm organization, intra-firm incentives structures and
externalities, has explained many salient features of the firm.  While the make-or-buy decision 
has been studied in detail, an item on the Coase (1937) agenda that has received comparatively
little attention is the decision to produce more than one product for sale.
1  This is unfortunate in
light of the prevalence of the firm attribute.
Firms may produce two or more products for a number of reasons.  The transactions costs
motives for product diversification emphasize the trade-off between scope economies due to
production externalities or technical cost inefficiencies in single-product firms and the
organizational costs of internalizing these activities.  For developed countries with dense capital
and state-contingent markets, the risk management motive for diversification has been widely
dismissed.  However, academic debates on other plausible merits of a diversified firm have not
been resolved.  Berger and Ofek (1995) identify a stock market discount on conglomerate firms,
in the period 1986 through 1991, relative to an imputed value were the firm’s businesses traded
as separate stock.
2  They point to agency problems in intra-firm capital allocation as the cause. 
While not completely discounting this thesis, Klein’s (2001) study of conglomerates supports
Alchian’s (1969) argument that conglomerates can utilize information more efficiently than can
external markets when allocating capital to specific uses.  In particular, this may have been the
case for conglomerates during the 1960s.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) also find empirical
evidence suggesting efficient capital allocation within the conglomerate firm.
Laux (2001) motivates diversification as a mechanism to mitigate an executive2
compensation problem.  Limited liability renders it difficult for an owner to encourage
performance enhancing decisions by a risk-neutral manager.  Rather than deter shirking by
increasing the default (efficiency) wage and then penalizing severely for measured output
deficiencies, the owner might increase the number of projects under the manager.  Rewards on
these other projects can be used to bond the manager, and so overcome the limited liability
problem while lowering the expected cost of doing so.
Multi-good production might enhance a firm’s market power in a number of ways.  For
instance, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) demonstrated how collusion might be more readily
supported when oligopolists compete in two or more markets.  Whinston (1990) showed how a
monopolist that elects to produce a second good for an imperfectly competitive market may
increase profits by a tying strategy that forces competitors to exit.  Concerned with the role of
incumbency in market dynamics, Carlton and Waldman (2002) proposed some strategic roles for
tying.  It may be used to preserve a monopoly in the presence of technical change, and it may also
be used to dominate a new market.
Exclusively technical motives for multi-product activities are also readily conjectured.  In
agriculture, crop rotations can act to mitigate pest problems, conserve moisture, promote soil
tilth, enhance soil nutrient status, and better sequence time commitments during busy periods.  In
mining, forestry or fishing, heterogeneity in raw materials imply that production activities may
yield a variety of elements, minerals or species.  In manufacturing, scope economies in
purchasing, advertising or product development can provide motives for manifold outputs. 
These scope economies can arise in somewhat subtle forms.  For example, Mitchell (2000) has
pointed to scope economies in learning as a motive for multi-product firms, and he also models
the idea that technological dissimilarities limit the firm’s incentive to diversify.
The fact that a large fraction of production as final goods originates from non-specialist
firms is relevant for a number of government policies.   In the case of imperfectly competitive3
markets, the effects of power in multiple markets on anti-competitive behavior is a concern. 
Sometimes too environmental externalities may be at issue.  For example, the computation of
optimal output and input taxes must acknowledge the effects on all markets.  Further, any
constraint on a firm’s production patterns will have implications for equilibrium output prices.
In all of the above, it is not just the fact that a firm elects to produce two or more goods for
sale that is relevant.  The comparative intensities of production matter.  Yet apart from a long
empirical tradition in the duality literature, as in Fuss and McFadden (1978), little is known
about the determinants of vector valued outputs.  We claim that heterogeneity together with the
related phenomenon of symmetry comprise an important determinant of this key facet of firm
behavior.
To develop our thesis, this paper provides a framework for analyzing the product mix that a
firm elects to produce.  We will do so by inferring bounds on the firm’s optimal decision vector
in output space from the pertaining cost and revenue functions.  The key assumption is that some
weak symmetry property is possessed by the firm’s multi-product technology.  This symmetry
property can be weak in two senses.  First, the arguments of the technology’s cost function can
undergo symmetry breaking transformations before any concept of symmetry need be invoked on
the resulting ‘pseudo-cost’ functional.  Second, the type of symmetry that is required to exist on
this pseudo-cost functional may be far weaker than the usual notion of symmetry, permutation
symmetry, whereby a function is invariant under any permutation of argument values in the
function.
The tools most suitable for our problem originate in group algebra and convex analysis.  The
latter set of tools are at the foundations of modern production, consumption and equilibrium
theory.  In general equilibrium theory, the former set of tools have been applied by Balasko
(1990) to study sunspot equilibria.  Groups have also been used by Koopmans et al. (1964), Sato
(1976), Vogt and Barta (1997), and others to study time preferences, production, and    
3 We note also that groups on topologies arise in the mathematical study of fixed points (Munkres,
2000).  While elements of algebraic topology are widely used in game theory, as in Herings and Peeters
(2001), a formal group theory approach does not appear to have been used.
    
4 See, e.g., the textbook by Schervish (1995).
4
aggregation.  That line of research, however, is in the tradition of analytic functional equations. 
It seeks attributes on functions such that certain derivative properties, such as integrability,
aggregability, and separability, are satisfied by a function representation of a preference structure
or a technology.
3  Their studies relate nothing about level vectors, e.g., when does a firm produce
at least twice as many tons of product A than product B?
Our present research seeks to identify structure on the level vectors of production decisions. 
The approach that we take has much in common with the equivariance theory of statistical
analysis.
4  The sorts of questions that are asked in equivariance theory may pertain to the class of
objective functions (i.e., expected loss functions) such that a given statistic-conditioned decision
rule is invariant to the measurement units.  There, the focus is on the performance of a decision
rule so as to remove rules that perform poorly.  We, however, have our profit maximization
decision rule at hand, and are content with it.  Our focus is, rather, on the description of that
decision rule as it relates to parameters in the objective function.  Thus, while the statistics
literature restricts the properties that the decision consequences may have in order to refine the
set of objective functions that one might wish to consider, we fix on a decision rule and then
explore the decision consequences.
The most closely related research is that due to Hennessy and Lapan (2003a).  In a general
permutation group framework, they identify bounds on the output allocation vector for a multi-
plant firm that seeks to minimize the cost of producing a single homogeneous good.  Using a
similar tool kit, Lapan and Hennessy (2002) and Hennessy and Lapan (2003b) have analyzed the
portfolio allocation problem.  There, symmetric (2002) and general permutation (2003b) group
structures on a vector of random returns were shown to provide bounds on the fund allocation5
vector, as well as inferences on welfare, diversification, and fund separation. 
This paper commences with a presentation of the structure that is assumed on the multi-
output firm’s profit maximization problem.  The firm need not be a price-taker, although stronger
deductions can be made if price-taking is assumed.  Having formalized the problem in Section 2,
we overview some of the relevant concepts from finite group theory.  Section 4 assumes, apart
from some group invariance, only that the pseudo-cost functional is monotone.  Our central result
is a dominance relation for points on the hull that a particular group generates when it is applied
to the optimum decision vector.  A particular instance of this result provides conditions under
which the ratio of product A to product B that a price-taking firm sells is in excess of some
number, say two.  Similar results can be generated for a firm that produces in a multi-product
monopoly environment, or when product markets have mixed structures.
Section 5 specializes to price-taking and to linear transformations on the pseudo-cost
functional’s arguments.  There, we apply methods from convex analysis to study the structure of
admissible regions in output space.  These regions are convex, can be decomposed into a
particular vector sum of sets, and must contain a specific translated ray.  An admissible region
need not be a polyhedral cone.  The defining conditions for an admissible region are
decomposable into a collection of disjoint conditions if the group is decomposable into a direct
product of a group family and if the argument sets on which each family member acts are
disjoint.  The final analysis section makes the additional assumption of cost function
quasiconvexity.  Then, by use of group majorization relations, the central dominance relation for
points on a group-generated hull that includes the optimum can be extended to points in that
convex hull.  The paper concludes with discussions on extensions and empirical issues.
2  Problem
A profit maximizing multi-product firm receives revenue   where the i
th output is R(q1,q2,...,qn)6
C(µ1,µ2,...,µn):¯ ú
n
% 6 ¯ ú%,µ i ' Hi(qi), Hi(qi):¯ ú% 6 ¯ ú%, i 0 Ωn, (1)
represented by  .  In order to admit flexibility when modeling cost asymmetries across outputs, qi
we do not specify the cost function directly.  Instead we model it as a ‘pseudo-cost’ functional
where outputs have been transformed before entering the functional.  This pseudo-cost functional
is given by
where  , and   is the closed n-dimensional positive orthant on real numbers.  Ωn ' {1,2,...,n} ¯ ú
n
%
Input prices are fixed and are suppressed to conserve on notation.  The   are continuously Hi(@)
differentiable on  , with  .  They are also invertible [0,4) dHi(q)/dq ' hi(q) 0 (0, 4) œ q 0 [0,4)
with  . qi ' H
&1
i (µi) ' Ji(µi)
By substitution we may define  , but there is no loss of D(P q) ' C[H1(q1),H2(q2),...,Hn(qn)]
generality in studying   rather than   because both have the same solution up to the C(P µ) D(P q)
 transformations.  The advantage of using the form   is that the transformations  Hi(@) C(P µ) Hi(@)
allow flexibility in designing   such that it has symmetries of a particular type.  These C(P µ)
symmetries can be exploited in a manner to be elaborated upon shortly.  Any inferences drawn on
the optimal choice of   can then be inverted through the bijections provided by the   in order P µ Hi(@)
to relate equivalent inferences on the optimal choice of  . P q
The transformations capture unidimensional asymmetries in the production technology, but
inter-dimensional asymmetries in the technology may also arise.  We employ group theory to
capture asymmetries across dimensions.  To this end, and throughout the paper, we make
Assumption 1.    is increasing and  -symmetric. C(@):¯ ú
n
% 6 ¯ ú% ˜ G
In the section to follow, we will define and discuss the sorts of  -symmetry properties of ˜ G    
5 Note the solution would have been the same, upon transformation, had we instead solved
. max






P µ 0 ¯ ú
n
%
R[J1(µ1),J2(µ2),...,Jn(µn)] & C(µ1,µ2,...,µn). (2)
interest.  As an illustration, the most readily described is permutation symmetry which we label
as  -symmetry.  When viewed as a group acting on function arguments, as represented by the ˜ Sn
index set  , group   is called the symmetric group on  .  With this symmetry property, Ωn ˜ Sn Ωn
 where   is any one of the   permutations on a given (transformed) output vector C(P µ) ' C(P µg) P µg n!
.  Because the extent of symmetry that  -symmetry admits is quite large, the set of cost P µ 0 ¯ ú
n
% ˜ Sn
functions that satisfy it is comparatively small.  The formal treatment of permutation group
theory will impose less extensive symmetry, and so will typically admit larger sets of cost
functions that satisfy some  -symmetry property. ˜ G
The agent’s revenue function is given by  , and we assert  R[J1(µ1),J2(µ2),...,Jn(µn)]
Assumption 2.    is increasing. R(q1,q2,...,qn):¯ ú
n
% 6 ¯ ú%
The agent’s decision problem, which we identify as (P), is then to
5
For a given competitive environment, and assuming an interior optimum, identify the optimum
as   or   where  .  Notice that, while we do not allow strategic interactions among P µ( P q( q(
i ' Ji(µ(
i)
firms, the specification is otherwise quite general.  For example, the firm may be a price-taker in
all its output markets, a monopolist in all its output markets, or a price-taker in some and a
monopolist in the remaining set.
Our interest is in understanding what revealed preferences, together with symmetry property









i'1 piJi(µi) & C(µ1,µ2,...,µn). (3)
the firm is a price-taker in all of its output markets and receives the exogenous unit price pi >0
for the i
th output.  Then the problem, which we label as (P’), is
While the optimizations in (P) and (P’) rely on tools from analysis, our interest is in the
optimized vector.  There, we will demonstrate how algebraic properties on the optimized
objective function can be used to identify order on the decision vector.
3  Algebraic concepts
Our approach involves exploiting an iso-cost contour in   so that preferences over decision P q 0 ¯ ú
n
%
vectors are confined to preferences over revenue function evaluations.  When the cost function
obliges, then an iso-cost contour can be generated by permutations on the arguments.  Cost
invariances may be depicted through group operations.
Definition 1.  A group,  , is a set of elements, G, together with a single-valued binary ˜ G
operation, *, such that the structure satisfies all of
I) closure; G is closed with respect to *,
II) identity element;   such that  , › e 0 Gg (e ' e(g ' g œ g 0 G
III) inverse elements;   there exists a unique element, labeled  , such that  œ g 0 Gg &1 0 Gg (g&1
, ' g&1(g ' e
IV) associativity;  , where the operations in g1((g2(g3) ' (g1(g2)(g3 œ g1,g2,g3 0 G
parentheses occur first. 
Thus a group is a set of operations together with a composition operation such that the whole    
6 Here, the cycle notation   represents the argument bijection  .  For group element  (i,j,k) i 6 j 6 k 6 ig 1
, the other four arguments are fixed and are omitted in the cycle notation.  Group element  ' (1,2) g3 '
 asserts that bijections   and   occur simultaneously. (1,2)(5,6) 1 : 25 : 6
9
structure satisfies four structural properties.  These properties are ideal for studying invariance, in
our case a fixed cost level.  To be quite specific about what a group element   does, in our g 0 G
context it acts on a set.  This is the set of arguments  , and the group performs a bijection on Ωn
.  We write   if group element   replaces the i
th argument of a function with the pre- Ωn g(i) ' jg
existing j
th argument.
Example 1.  Pseudo-cost function   is  -symmetric, i.e., invariant, under permutation C(P µ) ˜ S3
group   when  .  This is true because, by iterating the ˜ S3 C(µ1,µ2,µ3) ' C(µ2,µ1,µ3) ' C(µ3,µ2,µ1)
transposition operations we have   also.  C(µ1,µ2,µ3) ' C(µ1,µ3,µ2) ' C(µ2,µ3,µ1) ' C(µ3,µ1,µ2)
The group has   elements, one for each permutation under which the pseudo-cost functional 3! ' 6
is invariant.  That is, the cardinality of set  ,   and which we refer to as the order of the S3 *S3*
group, is 6.  Returning to the invariance  , let the pertinent group C(µ1,µ2,µ3) ' C(µ2,µ3,µ1)
element that takes   to   be  .  Then  , and  . (µ1,µ2,µ3)( µ 2,µ3,µ1)ˆ g ˆ g(1) ' 2, ˆ g(2) ' 3ˆ g(3) ' 1
Example 2.  Cost function   is invariant under  , the C(q1,...,q6) ' ˆ C(q1%q2,q3%2q4,q5%q6) ˜ Ga
group that allows   to permute with   only and   with   only.  The transposition of   with q1 q2 q5 q6 q3
 does not generate an invariance because   is not quite symmetric.  The group has four q4 q3 % 2q4
elements.  In cycle notation, write e as the identity element,  ,  , and    g1 ' (1,2) g2 ' (5,6) g3 '
 so the set of group operations is  .
6 (1,2)(5,6) Ga ' {e,g1,g2,g3}
If, however, we re-labeled  , then the modified cost function is symmetric in ˆ q4 ' 2q4
transpositions of   with  .  In this way, we may extend the group to include also  , q3 ˆ q4 g4 ' (3,4)
,  , and  .  By checking each of the g5 ' (1,2)(3,4) g6 ' (3,4)(5,6) g7 ' (1,2)(3,4)(5,6)
conditions in Definition 1, it is readily demonstrated that   is a group, under the same operation ˜ Gb    
7 Finite permutation groups are easy to work with and illustrate.  Our analysis can be extended to model
all transformations on an argument vector that preserve a well-defined iso-cost contour.  This approach
would, perhaps, be best studied using continuous transformation groups.
10
as  , when the element set is  . ˜ Ga Gb ' {e,g1,g2,g3,g4,g5,g6,g7}
In Example 2, there is clearly a strong connection between groups   and  .  ˜ Ga ˜ Gb
Definition 2.  A subgroup   of group   is a group with element set H such that  ˜ H ˜ G
I) H is a subset of set G
II) G and H are closed under the same operation *.  
The subgroup relation is written as  .  ˜ H ¥ ˜ G
Thus,  .  The large literature on groups has been applied to many object sets.  As we ˜ Ga ¥ ˜ Gb
have seen in examples 1 and 2, in our case we seek only to permute a set of finite order; the set of
arguments in a cost function.
7  The descriptive terminology for this context is given as follows:
Definition 3.  Let   be a finite non-empty set of objects with cardinality  .  A bijection of  Ωn n Ωn
onto itself is called a permutation of  .  The set of all such permutations forms a group under Ωn
the composition of bijections.  This is the symmetric group of  , and is denoted by  .  Group Ωn ˜ Sn
 is said to act on set  .  Any subgroup of   is called a permutation group. ˜ Sn Ωn ˜ Sn
Example 3.  In Example 2, let   so that  .  All are subgroups of  . Gc ' {e,g1} ˜ Gc ¥ ˜ Ga ¥ ˜ Gb ˜ S6
At this point we are in a position to make assertions about problems (P) and (P’).





















g(n)) œ g 0 G. (5)
A simple revealed preference argument readily establishes a system of inequalities that any
optimal solution must satisfy.
Theorem 1.  For (P) under assumptions 1 and 2, then 
Proof.  By revealed preference, we have
Cancellation, due to cost functional  -symmetry, then yields the result for each  . ~ ˜ Gg 0 G
Notice that the evaluations of the cost functional are on those permutations of   that render P µ(
the cost functional invariant.  It is for this reason that the convexity status of   is of no C(P µ)
relevance to the finding.  Indeed, even monotonicity on   and on   are not necessary and C(P µ) R(P q)
are only imposed because they are almost certainly true in the economic context of interest to us.
The inequalities in (4) generate an unconstrained admissible region,  , for solution set A(P q()
 where ‘admissible region’ is to be interpreted as the region in which we have found that the P q(
solution must live.  We do not yet assert that it can live at any point in the admissible region, but
we will return to this issue in the section to follow.  We can, however, impute implications for
the impact of quantity restrictions on firm profits.  Let   be a constraint set on firm V(P q)
production activities such that a chosen output vector must satisfy   to comply with P q( 0 V(P q)







g(i)) œ g 0 G. (6)
Corollary 1.1.  For (P) under assumptions 1 and 2
I) if   then firm profits are policy constrained. A(P q()_V(P q) ' i
II) if  , then firm profits are not policy constrained. A(P q() f V(P q)
This constraint set might involve a prohibition on monoculture wheat production in order to
reduce soil erosion externalities.  Or it might involve a local government requirement that a home
builder construct 20% of houses in a sub-division to be affordable for mid-income families. 
Upon specializing to price-taking behavior in all markets, we have
Corollary 1.2.  For (P’) under assumptions 1 and 2, then 
To obtain a sense of what relation (6) means, suppose that we let   so that    g(i) ' j Ji(µ(
g(i)) '
.  The expression is a quantity in the   dimension.  It is the quantity of   that H
&1
i [Hj(q(
j )] qi qi
delivers the same argument value in the i
th argument of   as   does in the j
th argument of C(P µ) q(
j
.  We will exploit this observation after presenting an illustration of the Theorem.  A further C(P µ)
specialization of Corollary 1.2, as given in Example 4 below, is quite instructive and provides a
basis for much of the analysis to follow.
Example 4.  Suppose that the pseudo-cost functional is  -invariant, and that  , ˜ Sn Hi(qi) ' αi % βiqi
.  Permutation group element  , which is defined as that under which the βi >0 œ i 0 Ωn gjk
pseudo-cost functional’s arguments are mapped according to  , is an element of set  .  j : kS n






αj & αk % βjq(
j & βkq(
k $ 0. (7)
This bound might be interpreted as a law of comparative supply; if the ‘normalized price’ of the
j
th good exceeds that of the k
th good, then the ‘normalized level’ of the j
th good exceeds that of the
k
th good.
If it is known that  , then we have the upper bound  .  pj/βj $ pk/βk q(
j $ (αk % βkq(
k & αj)/βj
Suppose that   while  .  Define   and   so that the upper αj >α k βk <β j b0 ' (αj&αk)/βk b1 ' βj/βk
bound may be written as  .  Then, together with the two non-negativity q(
k # b0 % b1q(
j
requirements   and  , the admissible region may be described as the semi-open region q(
j $ 0 q(
k $ 0
A in Figure 1.  In this example, the positive parts of all rays through the origin are contained in A
whenever the ray’s slope is no larger than  , while the unbounded convex region has two b1
vertices. 
If in addition, it is known that  , then  -invariance allows us pj/βj $ pk/βk œ j < k, j,k 0 Ωn ˜ Sn
to assert   for any pair of ordinates  .  In particular, if  αj % βjq(
j $ αk % βkq(
k j < k βi ' β œ i 0 Ωn
then   where the bounding lines have unit slopes.  Instead, if  q(
j $ q(
k % (αk&αj)/β αi ' α œ i 0 Ωn
then   whenever  .  In this case, the βjq(
j $ βkq(
k œ j < k, j,k 0 Ωn pj/βj $ pk/βk œ j < k, j,k 0 Ωn
, can be thought of as efficiency coefficients and the bounding conditions all pass βi, i 0 Ωn
through the origin.  Since  , we have   so that the k
th pj/βj $ pk/βk pjq(
j $ pkq(
k œ j < k, j,k 0 Ωn
product revenue is less than or equal to the j
th product revenue.  Notice that each output is
distinguished by two sources of asymmetries, i.e., supply and demand side.  Yet, due to the
symmetries of the symmetric group and the fact that the cost function location shifters are
common, product revenues may be ranked in ascending order according to a single index,  , pi/βi
.  Due to the problem’s structure this composite index is, in a statistical sense, minimal i 0 Ωn
sufficient because no additional information is obtained about the rank order of revenues by    
8  On minimal sufficient statistics, see Schervish (1995, p. 92).
    




i (˜ µ) & H
&1
i (ˆ µ) $ H
&1
j (˜ µ) & H
&1
j (ˆ µ) whenever 0 < ˆ µ # ˜ µ. (8)
considering the demand and supply parameters separately.
8
The intent of Example 4 was to bring out some of the implications of symmetry that the
general transformation functions   might obscure.  However, stronger assertions may be Hi(q)
established without recourse to linear transformations of the arguments.  One approach is to view
the transformations as positive, finite measures on   so that existing work in probability theory ¯ ú%
may be invoked.
  
Definition 4.  Positive, finite, invertible measure   is said to be larger in the dispersive µi ' Hi(qi)
order than positive, finite, invertible measure   if µj ' Hj(qj)
The partial order relation is written as  .   Hi(q) $
disp
Hj(q)
The order, a variant of which is discussed in Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994), is of interest







Theorem 2.  For (P’) under assumptions 1 and 2, let  .  Then   whenever   if gij 0 G µ(
i $ µ(
j pi $ pj
and only if
I) , or equivalently Hi(q) $
disp
Hj(q)
II)  is increasing in q, or equivalently H
&1
i [Hj(q)] & q
III) . hj[H
&1
j (µ)] $ hi[H
&1
i (µ)] œ µ $ 015
Part III) provides, perhaps, the best intuition for the result.  At equivalent levels of pseudo-
output, i.e., the levels entering the pseudo-cost functional, the transformations provide a bias
toward a lower marginal cost for the i
th product than for the j
th product.
Example 5.  If   and   with  , then   because it can Hi(q) ' βiqH j(q) ' βjq 0<β i <β j Hi(q) $
disp
Hj(q)
be seen from part II) that expression   must be increasing.  Theorem 2 then concludes βjq/βi & q
that   whenever  .  Notice that this example is consistent with Example 4 when βiq(
i $ βjq(
j pi $ pj
.  Example 4, in fact, generates somewhat stronger results because it exploits the αi ' α œ i 0 Ωn
ray property in  .  In Example 4, inference   may be drawn whenever  Hi(q) ' βiq βiq(
i $ βjq(
j pi $
, so that   is admissible. βi pj/βj pi < pj
That   and   are dispersively ordered is just the assertion of the fact that Hi(q) ' βiqH j(q) ' βjq
distinct uniform probability distributions can be dispersively ordered.  Other examples of
dispersive order are readily confirmed.  Two univariate normal distributions with distinct
variances are dispersively ordered regardless of their means.  Also, for the family of measures
 we have that   whenever  .  This is because we may Hi(q) ' H(αi % βiq) Hj(q) $
disp
Hk(q) βj # βk
insert   into (8). [H&1(µ)&αi]/βi ' q ' H
&1
i (µ)
5  Linear transformations and monotone cost
In this section we assume that   under problem (P’).  We do this because Hi(qi) ' αi % βiqi
findings in the large literature on linear algebra can then be applied.  For an arbitrary permutation
group, and where the transformations are linear, use of Corollary 1.2 shows that the solution set






× αi & αg(i) % βiq(
i & βg(i)q(
g(i) $ 0 œ g 0 G,
q(







× αi & αg(i) % βiq(
i & βg(i)q(
g(i) $ 0 œ g 0 G, (10)








g(i) $ 0 œ g 0 G,
q(
i $ 0 œ i 0 Ωn.
(12)
For future reference we will write the solution set to the group-generated inequalities,
as  .  Notice that for the identity element, e, inequality (10) reduces to the trivial  , ‹(P α,P β, ˜ G)0 $ 0
and may be discarded. 
Example 6.  To see that the bounds in system (9) may be tight, consider 
where   is increasing.  Then, since output prices are strictly positive, any  ˆ C(·):¯ ú% 6 ¯ ú% µi … µj
would violate profit maximization for interior solutions.  Therefore,  .  In this µ(
i ' µ(
j œ i,j 0 Ωn
case, all   group   generated bounds in system (9) are satisfied with equality. *G* ˜ G
Following Solodovnikov (1980), system (9) may be decomposed through successive
simplifications.  Commence with the inhomogeneous inequalities as given in system (9).  Next,
develop a set of homogeneous inequalities by removing the constant terms in each equation, i.e.,








g(i) ' 0 œ g 0 G,
q(
i ' 0 œ i 0 Ωn.
(13)
The latter system can be further simplified by imposing equalities for each of the weak
inequalities so that 
This homogeneous system of equalities clearly has a unique solution,  . q(
i ' 0 œ i 0 Ωn
Solodovnikov’s analysis of system (9) is of relevance to our study because he makes much use of
the concept of a normal system. 
Definition 5. [Solodovnikov (1980, p. 30)] A system of linear inequalities is said to be normal if
the corresponding system of homogeneous equations has only the zero solution.
Thus, system (9) is normal.  The solution to the system may be broken into two steps:
STEP 1: Take some n equations from the   equations in (9), the system of inhomogeneous n % *G*
inequalities.  Replace the inequalities with equalities, and solve that sub-system.  Do this for all
sub-systems comprised of consistent and independent equations, i.e., that give unique solutions
as quantity points in  .  There are at most   such sub-systems.  For each ún (n%*G*)!/(n!*G*!)
solution, return to system (9) and validate that it satisfies the larger system.  If it does not, then
discard it.  The remaining solutions could be called vertices for the system.  Let there be   such m
points, with  , and label them   with   and  .  Write the m # (n%*G*)!/(n!*G*!) Vi i 0 Ωm Vi 0 ¯ ú
n
%
convex hull of these points as  . ÚV1,V2,...,Vmá
STEP 2: Take all sub-systems of   equations from the   equations in (13), the system n&1 n % *G*18
T ' ÚV1,V2,...,Vmá % ÚE1,E2,...,Erá. (14)
of homogeneous equalities.  There are at most   such sub-systems.  (n%*G*)!/[(n&1)!(*G*%1)!]
Solve each sub-system, where each solution set may be written as a line in  .  If a non-zero ún
point on this line satisfies system (12), then place the point in set  .  All equations in system E
(13) pass through the origin.  When such a point satisfies system (12), then one half of the line
satisfies system (12).  Suppose that   where  .  Label the r ' *E* (n%*G*)!/[(n&1)!(*G*%1)!] $ r
elements of set   as  , and construct the convex set of points   that can EE i, i 0 Ωr ÚE1,E2,...,Erá
be written as  . '
r
i'1riEi, ri 0 ¯ ú%
Proposition 1.  System (9) is normal, and the solution set
I) is convex, 
II) may be represented as 
where the addition operation is the vector addition of sets.
The solution set may or may not be a convex polyhedral cone, a characterization that would
be particularly convenient to work with. 
Definition 6. [see Solodovnikov (1980, p. 21)] A convex polyhedral cone is the intersection of a
finite number of half-spaces whose bounding planes all pass through a common point, called the
vertex of the cone.
Example 7.  Returning to Figure 1 and Example 4, where  , we see that the pj/βj $ pk/βk
described region is not a convex polyhedral cone.  It has two vertices,   and  V1 ' (0,0) V2 '










œ θ $ max[α1,α2,...,αn]. (15)
whereby  .  The equation   is not an edge because there exists no non-zero point on qk ' b1qj qj ' 0
 that satisfies both   and  .  The convex hull of vertices is given by    qj ' 0 qk $ 0 qk # b1qj ÚV1,V2á '
.  Set   is the convex polyhedral cone with vertex  (0,0)λ % (0,b0)(1&λ), λ 0 [0,1] ÚE1,E2á (0,0)
and generated by the pair of halfspaces  ,  . qk $ 0 qk # b1qj
Set   is not a polyhedral cone because the extreme points on segment ÚV1,V2á % ÚE1,E2á
, are both vertices.  The vertices only coincide when  .  If (0,0)λ % (0,b0)(1&λ), λ 0 [0,1] αj ' αk
we were to amend Example 4 so that  , then   and the non-negativity constraint  αj <α k b0<0 qk $ 0
would not bind.  In that case the only vertex would be  . ((αk&αj)/βj,0 )
The propositions to follow in this section will clarify some of the attributes of solution set
(14).  Because system (10) is group-generated, the inequalities are not arbitrary.  Inspection of
group-generated system (10) clarifies that these bounding hyperplanes possess  P q0 '
 as a common point.  In particular, the point   is either the unique (&α1/β1,&α2/β2,...,&αn/βn) P q0
vertex or a ‘shadow’ vertex that is inadmissible only due to one or more non-negativity
constraint.  This endows the solution set with a particular structure.  For this reason the solution
set could plausibly be a convex polyhedral cone, i.e., all bounding planes among the n % *G*
linear constraints pass through a common point.  Some development of this observation
establishes two results.
Proposition 2.  The solution set to system (9) is not bounded.  Further, it contains all points on
the semi-open line segment 20
Proposition 3.  The admissible region
I) is given by   where   is a convex polyhedral cone with vertex  . ‹(P α,P β, ˜ G)_¯ ú
n
% ‹(P α,P β, ˜ G) P q0
II) contains the origin if and only if  .  This condition is '
n
i'1( pi/βi)(αi & αg(i)) $ 0 œ g 0 G
satisfied if  , or if  . αi ' α 0ú œi 0 Ωn ( pi/βi & pj/βj)(αi & αj) $ 0 œ i,j 0 Ωn
III) is the convex polyhedral cone generated by system (10) if   and the  max[α1,α2,...,αn] # 0β i
are all distinct.
That (15) satisfies the system can be verified by insertion to obtain equality for each of the
group-generated inequalities.  Unboundedness is a consequence of the unboundedness of the
semi-open line segment,  .  Part I) of Proposition 3 re-organizes the set of θ $ max[α1,α2,...,αn]
bounding hyperplanes.  Parts II) and III) draw implications when the non-negativity constraints
are all binding, as in part II), or are all slack, as in part III).
Example 8.  In Figure 2, where the context is the same as in Figure 1 except that now  , the αj <α k
admissible region (in dimensions   and  ) is a convex polyhedral cone.  This is because the qj qk
constraint   does not now bind, as has been explained in Example 7. qk $ 0
Depending on the group order, and also the dimension and values of the parameter vectors P α
and  , it may be difficult to study the solution set for system (9).  Therefore, it would be of some P β
interest to ascertain when it is possible to simplify the solution set.  It is possible to do so when
the group of symmetries is, in some sense, separable.  To this end we introduce
Definition 7. [see Hungerford (1974, p. 59)] Let  , be a family (i.e., a set) of ˜ G
i, i 0 ΩI











Example 9.  For the pseudo-cost functional  , suppose that first two C(P µ) ' C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5)
arguments permute, i.e.,  .  This invariance corresponds C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) / C(µ2,µ1,µ3,µ4,µ5)
to a group of order 2, and we call it   with element set   where the first element is ˜ G
1 G1 ' {e1,g1
1}
the identity.  Suppose also that the invariances related to the other three arguments are given by
group   with element set   where   corresponds to the identity invariance ˜ G
2 G2 ' {e2,g2
1,g2
2} e2
,   corresponds to the invariance    C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) / C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) g2
1 C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5)
, and   corresponds to the invariance  / C(µ1,µ2,µ4,µ5,µ3) g2
2 C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) /




represented by the elements   [i.e., identity invariance    (e1,e2) C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) /
],   [i.e.,  ],   [i.e., C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) (g1
1,e2) C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) / C(µ2,µ1,µ3,µ4,µ5) (e1,g2
1)
],   [i.e.,  C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) / C(µ1,µ2,µ4,µ5,µ3) (g1
1,g2
1) C(µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4,µ5) /




Direct product groups are of interest because they identify fault lines along which the
dimensions of problem (9) may be reduced.  In particular, in Example 9 note that the path that
each argument in a cost functional may take is strictly smaller than argument set  .  To Ω5
formalize the idea that the argument set may be partitioned according to the paths taken when
operated on by group elements, we employ the definitions of the orbit of an argument, a G-space,
and a decomposable group. 
Definition 8.  For group   acting on  , the orbit of  , which is labeled  , is the subset ˜ G Ωn k 0 Ωn Ok
of   that   replaces the k
th coordinate with.  That is, write   as the element of   that Ωn ˜ Gi ' g(k)Ω n
group element   replaces   with.  Then  .   gk O k ' {i 0 Ωn:g(k) ' i, g 0 G}22
Definition 9. [See Cameron (1999, p. 2)] For group   acting on  , a G-space is a set  ˜ G Ωn ∆ f Ωn
(called a G-set) together with a function   satisfying the conditions  γ:∆×G 6 ∆
a) γ(γ(α,gi),gj) ' γ(α,gi(gj) œ α 0 ∆, œ gi, gj 0 G
b) . γ(α,e) ' α œ α 0 ∆
In Example 1, the only G-set for   acting on   is   itself when the function is just the ˜ S3 Ω3 Ω3
group acting on the G-set,  .  No other   will do because no other   is γ(α,gi) ' gi(α) ∆ f Ω3 ∆ f Ω3
closed under group  .  In Example 2,   has the G-set  .  It also has the G-sets  ˜ S3 ˜ Ga {1,2} {5,6}
and  .  Notice that, for permutation groups in general, if an element of   is in two G- {1,2,5,6} Ωn
sets for the same group then one of the G-sets must contain the other.  This is because a G-set
must contain either all the elements of an argument’s orbit or none of the elements of the orbit.
Definition 10. [See Hungerford (1974, p. 83)] A permutation group   is said to be ˜ G
decomposable if there exists a family of permutation groups,  , such that  .  ˜ G




This decomposition need not be unique.  
Proposition 4.  Let   be the group of invariances on the pseudo-cost functional where   is ˜ G ˜ G





family member with  .  Then system (9) decomposes into I sub-systems ∆j_∆k ' iœ j, k 0 ΩI
such that the admissible region for the values of the arguments represented by the G-set    ∆i, i 0
, is independent of arguments outside that set. ΩI
Example 10.  Let the direct product group and pseudo-cost functional be as in Example 9. 

















































3 $ 0, q(
4 $ 0, q(
5 $ 0.
(16'')
decomposes into the sub-system with non-trivial conditions
and the sub-system with non-trivial requirements
The admissible regions are mutually separated so that the prices and productivities for one set of
arguments have no effect on the admissible region for the other set of arguments.
6  Quasiconvex cost
As far as the approach that we have taken is concerned, the quasiconvexity property carries with
it particularly useful structure on the level sets.  Specifically, quasiconvexity of the cost
functional allows a pre-ordering on vectors called G-majorization to be employed to advantage.
Assumption 3.    is increasing, quasiconvex and  -symmetric. C(@):¯ ú
n
% 6 ¯ ú% ˜ G




n)] $ R[J1(µ1),J2(µ2),...,Jn(µn)] œP µ 0 ,(P µ(). (17)
exploit this additional structure.
Definition 11. [From Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 422)] Let   be a group of linear ˜ G
transformations mapping   to  .  Then   is group majorized by   with respect to group  , ún ún P z α P z β ˜ G
written as  , if   lies in the convex hull of the orbit of   under the group  . P z α ˜ ˜ G P z β P z α P z β ˜ G
For solution vector   to problem (P), write the convex hull as   where    P µ( ,(P µ() ,(P µ() ' {P µ:›
.  The following generalization of P α 0ú *G*,α i $ 0 œ i 0 Ω*G*, '
*G*
i'1 αi ' 1,P µ ' 'g0GP α·P µ
(
g}
Theorem 1 is readily demonstrated.
Theorem 3.  For (P) with assumptions 2 and 3, then 
The finding extends Theorem 1 in the following sense.  If quasiconvexity on the cost
functional is assumed, in addition to  -symmetry and monotonicity, then dominance a) relative ˜ G
to all group-generated points that define a convex hull may be strengthened to dominance b)
relative to all points on and in the convex hull.  That is, any point in the convex hull of P µ(
garners (weakly) lower revenue.
7  Discussion
The intent of this paper has been to show that a study of a firm’s production decision vector
which emphasizes the presence and absence of structural symmetries can reveal much about what
sorts of decisions are optimal.  The appeal of the approach arises from the simple and intuitive
consequences that fall out of accepting some form of group symmetry.25
Nonetheless, one might wonder how the results might hold up under more general
production environments.  For example, our treatment of preferences was elementary.  Caplin
and Nalebuff (1991), who study unimodal measures of product attribute demands, provide a
more realistic framework for viewing product preferences.  Their analysis, which is founded on
what the Brunn-Minkowski theorem has to say about the measure of a convex set in  , has a úm
strong geometry and algebra orientation.  Much of the recent work on measures of convex sets
has employed group theory [Tong (1980); Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988); Bertin et al.
(1997)].  It may be feasible to link a variant of the Caplin-Nalebuff demand structure with our
production structure to draw inferences about equilibrium pricing decisions for a multi-market
monopolist.
A general treatment of the multi-product firm in oligopoly markets will likely be more
challenging.  Quite apart from the larger set of strategic environments that present themselves,
there is the issue of accommodating the strategic interactions themselves.  For firms producing a
single, homogeneous good, Salant and Shaffer (1999) and others have exploited the symmetric
group to develop a theory of equilibrium.  Approaches that employ group theory or G-
majorization theory in a more formal manner may provide the modeler with sufficient lattitude to
glean useful additional insights.
Concerning the prospects for empirical inquiry into the forms taken by symmetries and
asymmetries in technologies and preferences, we note that the interest among statisticians in
symmetry has given rise to a large literature on testing for various symmetries and asymmetries. 
This literature includes, for example, work by Neuhaus and Zhu (1998) who develop a test for
symmetry under reflection groups, and by Koltchinskii and Li (1998) who develop a test for
spherical symmetry.
The above line of research seeks to establish a general framework for the study of
equilibrium level vectors in economic decision analysis.  A central feature of this framework26
involves the exploitation of invariance along a level curve.  In the theory of comparative statics
for economic systems, much use has been made of the related notion of the iso-quant.  It would
be of interest to establish how a theory of equilibrium level vectors might relate to the theory of
monotone comparative statics.  Observations on how levels and sensitivities of equilibrium





























Proof of Theorem 2.  For the reversed implication in part a), by invoking Corollary 1.2 we apply
group element   in inequality (6) to obtain gij
This is true for all  , so that it is true for  .  Therefore,  pi $ pj pi ' pj





i ) $ Hj(q(
j )
the reversed implication, let   and  .  Again we can choose over the interval  µ(
i $ µ(
j pi $ pj pi $ pj
and it is convenient to choose  .  Again we arrive at inequality (A.2), which must be true pi ' pj





To verify parts b) and c), we follow the obvious routes as given in Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994).  Relation (8) is true if and only if   is increasing in  .  Upon z(µ) ' H
&1
i (µ) & H
&1
j (µ) µ
substituting in  , the monotonicity of   generates the equivalent condition that µ ' Hj(q) Hj(q)
 be increasing in q.  Given that we have already assumed that the transformation H
&1
i [Hj(q)] & q
function derivatives exist, a straightforward differentiation of  , together with a little algebra, z(µ)
yields the equivalent expression as given in part c). ~
Proof of Proposition 1.  The property of ‘normal’ follows from the definition.  For convexity,
pick points   and   that satisfy system (9).  Clearly   also P qa P qb P qc ' λ P qa % (1&λ) P qb,λ 0 [0,1]











βi & βg(i) <0 . (A.4)
Proof of Proposition 3.  Part a) is just a re-statement of the conditions that define the admissible
region.  The if implication of the first assertion in part b) follows from the insertion of  P q( ' P 0
into system (9).  For the only if implication, suppose that there exists a   such that ˆ g 0 G
.  Then the origin does not satisfy one inequality in (9), and so is not '
n
i'1( pi/βi)(αi & αˆ g(i))<0
admissible. 
As for the second assertion, if   then  .  αi ' α 0ú œi 0 Ωn '
n
i'1( pi/βi)(αi & αg(i)) / 0 œ g 0 G
Alternatively, if   then the identity group element ( pi/βi & pj/βj)(αi & αj) $ 0 œ i,j 0 Ωn
maximizes the value of  .  That is,  '
n
i'1( pi/βi)αg(i), g 0 G '
n
i'1( pi/βi)αi ' maxg0G'
n
i'1( pi/βi)αg(i)
and  . '
n
i'1( pi/βi)(αi & αg(i)) $ 0 œ g 0 G
In part c), if   then  .  We will show that the solution to system max[α1,α2,...,αn] # 0 P q0 $ P 0
(9) is in the shifted positive orthant  .  If we can show this, then the inequalities   in P q($P q0 P q($ P 0
(9) are slack and may be ignored.  The demonstration will be done by perturbations in the locality
of the vertex.  In particular, consider the point  , where the P q1 ' P q0 % (0,0,...,ε,...,0)),ε > 0
only non-zero entry in vector   is at the i
th ordinate.  Suppose too, and without (0,0,...,ε,...,0))
loss of generality, that   for some  .  For this group element, and for the point  , βg(i) >β i g 0 G P q1
compute the bound
to obtain
Thus, any hyperplane through vertex   and parallel to any of the n axes does not intersect the P q0






× αk & αg(k) % βkq(
k & βg(k)q(




× αk & αˆ g(k) % βkq(
k & βˆ g(k)q(
ˆ g(k) $ 0 œ ˆ g 0 e1×e2×...× ˜ G
v×...eI. (A.6)
would remain in the positive orthant.  The condition   ensures that max[α1,α2,...,αn] # 0
. ~ ‹(P α,P β, ˜ G) f ¯ ú
n
%





Instead, choose   where the elements from all but one of the group ˆ g ' {e1,e2,...,gv
iv,...,eI}
family are identity elements.  Then (A.5) reduces to
If (A.6) is true for each  , then summation demonstrates that (A.5) is true for each  .  ˆ g 0 Gg 0 G
Conversely, if (A.6) is false for any   then (A.5) is false for some  ˆ g ' {e1,e2,...,gv
iv,...,eI} g 0
 because we may choose  .  Therefore, each of the I systems represented by (A.6) may be Gg ' ˆ g
solved separately. ~
Proof of Theorem 3.  If  , then there exists an   such that P µ 0 ,(P µ() P α ' (α1,...,α*G*) 0 [0,1]*G*
 and  .  By quasiconvexity and invariance on the convex hull, we have '
*G*
i'1αi ' 1 P µ ' 'g0GP α·P µ
(
g
that costs are smaller inside convex hull  , i.e.,  ,(P µ() C(P µ() ' 'g0GP α·C(P µ(
g) $










 with   and where it is clear that {g1,g2,...,g*G*&1,e} g*G* ' e









gi(n)) ' 'g0GP α·P µ
(
g 0 ,(P µ()




n)] $ R[J1(µ1),J2(µ2),...,Jn(µn)] œP µ 0 ,(P µ(). (A.7)
Put another way,  . ~ R[J1(µ(
1),...,Jn(µ(
n)] ' supP µ 0 ,(P µ()R[J1(µ1),...,Jn(µn)]31
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